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ABSTRACT 
 
The absence of commercial diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines hindered 
control efforts during the recent Zika and Ebola epidemics. This study evaluates the 
connectivity and productivity of both viruses’ R&D networks before, during, and after 
the epidemics to ascertain the ability of current R&D practices to support the 
development of crucial biotechnologies. Both network maps exhibited low baseline 
connectivity with emergent collaborative R&D practices during the identified outbreak 
period that correlated with increased research productivity. It is argued that formally 
establishing permanent collaborative, open R&D practices prior to epidemics can 
enhance scientific knowledge and innovation capabilities to more effectively advance 
commercial availability of diagnostics, therapies, and vaccines for emerging diseases. 
 
Keywords: Zika; Ebola; Open Access; Data Sharing; Emerging Diseases 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The recent emergence of Zika virus—a flu-like illness that was originally thought 
to only produce mild symptoms—has triggered widespread global panic due to a recently 
discovered causative association with birth defects in infants and neurological disorders 
in adults1,2. As the international community scrambles to effectively manage and control 
this emerging outbreak in the Americas3,4, predominately relying on traditional public 
health prevention measures and vector-control strategies5,6, the international research 
community has focused on the fact that, despite first identifying Zika nearly 70 years ago, 
the current scientific understanding of the neglected disease is lackluster7,8 and, perhaps 
most importantly, commercial diagnostics, therapies, and vaccines are nonexistent3. 
While this wasn’t inherently poor practice, as there exists no endogenous market 
incentives for neglected disease R&D9 and Zika previously only caused begin 
symptoms10, this dearth became significant given the unpredictability of the epidemic and 
associated high global burden of disease11. 
 
As we have become increasingly aware, there is a conspicuous gap between the 
global burden of all neglected diseases, including Zika, and the amount of research and 
policy focus received: despite representing 12% of the global disease burden, neglected 
diseases received only 1% of all R&D expenditures12. This is even lower for emerging 
neglected diseases. Indeed, as emerging infections that primarily affect low- and middle-
income countries, both Zika and Ebola faced institutionalized neglect in both public and 
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private R&D efforts prior to the initiation of their respective global outbreaks in 
2013/2014. Absent from even the World Health Organization’s list of seventeen 
neglected diseases13, Ebola and Zika were largely scientifically ignored until reaching 
epidemic potential: the international community did not pledge significant research funds 
nor attempt to fast track the development of commercial biotechnologies until after each 
disease was declared a “public health emergency of international concern”4,7. In order to 
successfully control and, possibly, eliminate diseases of epidemic potential, whether 
Zika, Ebola, or a still unknown emerging pathogen, a robust, global R&D capacity to 
more effectively innovate, develop, and commercialize biotechnologies for neglected 
diseases is paramount13,14. 
 
Cross-disciplinary, collaborative research strategies have emerged as a viable, 
nontraditional R&D approach to combat financial and human resource shortages while 
also advancing the ability to innovate15–17. Although there are many strategies to promote 
innovation and productivity in biotechnology R&D, networks that promote open 
knowledge exchange through exploitation of a collaborative environment—including 
open access, open data repository, and co-creation strategies—have been found to be 
highly successful in generating and supporting new biotechnologies18–20. Whereas rapid, 
reactionary responses to public health emergencies usually belie root causes and 
challenge existing infrastructure21, long-term biotechnology R&D facilitated by a 
collaborative approach can encourage the development of a multifaceted biomedical 
strategy for disease prevention and treatment9. In fact, based on social network and 
interaction theories, collaborative, open R&D strategies overtly bolster existing 
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knowledge exchange and innovation efforts, as well as facilitate advanced co-creation 
activities22,23. Consequently, open R&D networks can be an attractive long-term strategy 
for neglected and emerging disease R&D since they directly advance scientific 
understanding via collaborative data exchange and diversify new technology 
development via enriched innovation capacity24,25.  
 
Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) recognized the power of 
collaborative scientific R&D, specifically open access and data sharing, when it 
announced the need to improve data dissemination practices in September 20157. 
However, the WHO’s final recommendation only explicitly endorsed and supported data 
sharing and open access during identified public health emergencies26. While this is a 
laudable initial policy, the precise organization and practices of current emerging disease 
R&D networks is not known. As such, the effect of this reactionary open R&D approach 
is uncertain, particularly with respect to its ability to diminish an epidemic’s impact and 
to successfully develop commercial biotechnologies. Using network connectivity analysis 
and evaluation of research and commercial outputs, this paper ascertains the extent to 
which open access and data sharing practices presently occur in emerging disease 
research networks, using Zika and Ebola as case studies, and discusses the effect of 
reactionary R&D practices on the availability of crucial biotechnologies for emerging 
diseases prior to epidemics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
  
 This study seeks to understand current R&D practices for two emerging diseases, 
Zika and Ebola, by comparing R&D network connectivity and productivity before (five 
years), during, and after their largest outbreaks. Using this as a basis for understanding 
current R&D practices for emerging diseases, the relevance of WHO’s recommendation 
for short-term open access and data sharing is evaluated and potential strategies to 
improve precautionary, sustained R&D of vital biotechnologies for Zika, Ebola, and other 
emerging diseases are discussed. 
Identification of Outbreak Stages 
Identifying an outbreak is inherently variable with high heterogeneity in explicitly 
defining the exact point at which an outbreak begins and ends27. This is particularly true 
of emerging diseases, as illness by more common pathogens is usually rejected before 
alternative hypotheses are considered. As such, widespread knowledge about the start of 
an epidemic might not emerge until several months after an outbreak truly begins; 
nevertheless, some individuals may respond to an outbreak before pervasive global 
reaction, especially if the pathogen is rare, such as in the case of Ebola and Zika5. For this 
reason, a lag time corresponding with the first outbreak-specific publication (one month 
for Ebola and three months for Zika) was used to distinguish the “pre-outbreak” and 
“outbreak” stages. Since the Zika outbreak is still ongoing, only Ebola has a defined 
“post-outbreak” stage, which was determined by comparing the number of new cases to 
WHO’s assessment of the outbreak’s progression. As such, for the purpose of this study, 
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January 1, 2014-March 1, 2016 (most recent data available) represents the Zika outbreak 
period and January 1, 2014-December 31, 2015 represents the Ebola outbreak period. 
Months prior to this date represent the pre-outbreak period and subsequent months (Ebola 
only) represent the post-outbreak period. Although a lag time inherently exists with 
patents and publication dates, the range is highly variable and it is an aim of this study to 
evaluate how a network’s connectivity might have modulated productivity at the onset of 
an epidemic. Thus, no further lag time was used when assessing network productivity. 
Network Selection and Mapping 
Research collaborations were reconstructed using institutions listed on journal 
publications. As only current R&D knowledge networks for Zika and Ebola viruses were 
desired, since the aim of this study is to optimize current, existing research 
collaborations, only recent publications between January 1, 2009 and March 1, 2016 were 
used for network analysis. Biotechnology-related Ebola and Zika publications were 
identified via SCOPUS using the terms “Zika” and “Ebola” within its life sciences, health 
sciences, and physical sciences databases. Publications were reviewed for duplications 
and to ensure relevancy to the fields of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. 
Specifically, patient case studies, policy briefs, and publications that only reported 
epidemic-specific data were excluded. Of those initially identified by SCOPUS, 52/79 
(66%) listed publications for Zika and 1437/2601 (55%) listed publications for Ebola 
fulfilled inclusion criteria. All affiliated institutes listed on each publication were 
manually extracted and codified for subsequent network analysis. Network maps were 
generated and analyzed using a Fruchterman-Reingold force-directed algorithm via 
standard mapping software (Gephi 0.9.1). 
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Network Connectivity 
The innovation capacity of a network is directly proportional to its size, degree of 
interconnectivity of groups (“nodes”), and strength of association between connections 
(“links”)28. Thus, the structure of Zika and Ebola’s R&D networks was visually 
compared and quantified on the basis of connectivity, or degree of collaboration, via 
comparison of the location and size of nodes in the network and the presence of 
distinctive sub-networks. Using standard network mapping software (Gephi 0.9.1), the 
total number of nodes and links, maximum number of connected nodes, and average 
degree (i.e. the number of links per node) were directly calculated; network diameter and 
average link length were calculated using a relative “graph-distance” unit. Gephi also 
generated quantitative statistics describing the visual trends of the mapped network, 
namely graph density, average clustering coefficient, and modularity. A high centrality of 
nodes with saturated links indicates high collaboration, while a sparsely populated or 
dispersed network indicates a trend towards isolationist practices. Specifically, network 
diameter and link length indicate degree of closeness and betweenness centrality, while 
the clustering coefficient and graph density indicate the amount of network saturation. 
Additionally, network modularity measures how well a network decomposes into sub-
networks; a high modularity score indicates sophisticated internal structure and greater 
innovation capacity. This correlation operates under the assumption that the collective 
knowledge, tacit expertise, and ideas of nodes are continually created, shared, and 
iterated in tandem across each link29. Given this, a successful open R&D network should 
visually display a large number of highly connected nodes of similar sizes and 
numerically indicate a high graph density, clustering coefficient, and network modularity. 
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Network Productivity 
Network productivity was measured by analyzing three research and commercial 
outputs: journal publications, patents, and available commercial products. Publications 
and patents are commonly used as indicators of current scientific and technological 
productivity and are accepted measures of innovation and future R&D potential30. The 
methods for identifying relevant publications were previously described (n=52 for Zika 
and n=1437 for Ebola). In addition, US patents were identified using the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USTPO) patent full-text database. In particular, patents 
were included if the terms “Zika” or “Ebola” were included in a patent’s “Title”, 
“Claim(s)” and/or “Description/Specification” sections. Only patents with initial 
application dates between January 1, 2009 and March 1, 2016 were included (n=62 for 
Zika and n=1082 for Ebola). Finally, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) 
databases for medical devices and drugs were used to identify all approved commercial 
diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for Zika and Ebola using the terms “Zika” and 
“Ebola”. Only one commercial product total met the search criteria (n=0 for Zika and n=1 
for Ebola). Lastly, timelines of R&D and outbreak-specific events during the Ebola and 
Zika epidemics were constructed to ascertain and compare the biotechnology response to 
each global outbreak. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
  
 It was found that both the Ebola and Zika R&D network maps exhibited low 
connectivity during the pre-outbreak period with enhanced connectivity during the 
identified outbreak period [Table 1]. The outbreak period also correlated with an increase 
in network productivity, as seen by a temporary increase in publications and patents. 
Nevertheless, only one commercial product is available. 
 
!
EBOLA& ZIKA&
Before&Outbreak& During&Outbreak& A7er&Outbreak& Before&Outbreak& During&Outbreak&
Total&Number&of&Nodes& 602$ 777$ 347$ 31$ 176$
Total&Number&of&Links& 923$ 1115$ 400$ 20$ 156$
Network&Diameter& 10$ 11$ 9$ 3$ 6$
Average&Link&Length& 3.99$ 4.25$ 3.29$ 1.41$ 2.09$
Maximum&Connected&Components& 95$ 122$ 42$ 12$ 37$
Graph&Density& 0.003$ 0.002$ 0.003$ 0.022$ 0.005$
Average&Clustering&Coefficient& 0.06$ 0.05$ 0.03$ 0.000$ 0.03$
Average&Degree&(Links&per&Node)& 3.06$ 2.87$ 2.31$ 1.29$ 1.77$
Modularity& 0.60$ 0.66$ 0.74$ 0.70$ 0.87$  
Table 1. Summary of Network Analysis Results for Ebola and Zika Viruses 
 
 Network Connectivity 
Ebola 
 Similar to the trend of increased publications during the Ebola outbreak from 
2014-2015, the R&D network size swelled from 602 nodes and 923 links before the 
outbreak to 777 nodes and 1115 links during the outbreak [Figure 1]. This correlates with 
an increase in the maximum number of connected nodes (95 to 122). Although this alone 
does not definitively indicate a more open R&D network, it should be noted that while 
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the network diameter remained relatively constant before and during the outbreak (10 and 
11 graph-distances, respectively), there was a slight increase in the average length 
between nodes (3.99 and 4.25 graph-distances) and a similar average degree of node 
connectivity (3.06 and 2.87 links), graph density (0.003 and 0.002), and Watts-Strogatz 
clustering coefficient (0.06 and 0.05). However, following the conclusion of the outbreak, 
this connectivity diminished. Specifically, although the post-outbreak network diameter 
(9 graph-distances) remains analogous before and during the Ebola outbreak, the post-
epidemic network displayed reduced connectivity via declines in the average link length 
(3.29 graph-distances), clustering coefficient (0.03), average links per node (2.31), and 
the maximum number of connected components (42). The modularity increased across all 
intervals from 0.60 before the outbreak, 0.66 during the outbreak, and 0.74 after the 
outbreak. Three primary nodes coordinated virtually all Ebola biotechnology research: 
the University of Texas at Galveston (UT Galveston), the US National Institute of 
Health/National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIH/NIAID), and the US 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). These nodes had 
particularly strong links with universities and research institutes, including Makerere 
University, Institut Pasteur, and KU Leuven, as well as with various ministries of health 
in endemic countries and larger coordinating agencies like the WHO. 
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Figure 1. R&D Network Map of Ebola Before, During, and After Outbreak 
 
 
Zika 
Given its small network size, with only 31 nodes and 20 links before the current 
outbreak (2009-2013) and 176 nodes and 156 links during the outbreak (as of March 1, 
2016) it is clear that this R&D network is still being established [Figure 2]. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the network diameter for Zika biotechnology R&D has 
doubled (3 to 6 graph-distances) and the link length increased from 1.41 to 2.09 graph-
distances since the outbreak began in 2014, also indicating enhanced closeness and 
betweenness centrality. Moreover, the network has experienced a proliferation in its 
clustering coefficient (0.00 to 0.03) with the average number of links per node increasing 
from 1.29 to 1.77 graph-distances. As the clustering coefficient and link length indicate 
the degree of network saturation, this demonstrates movement from isolation to 
collaboration in R&D practices. Modularity increased from 0.70 to 0.87, which 
demonstrates the presence of an increased number of nodes with relatively similar high 
collaboration practices. The two most active nodes were Institut Louis Malard and 
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Institut Pasteur, which tended to form strong links with universities, particularly the 
University of Sao Paulo, and large national and international research institutes including 
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) and the German Centre for 
Infection Research (DZIF). 
 
 
Figure 2. R&D Network Map of Zika Before, During, and After Outbreak 
 
 
 
Network Productivity 
 Prior to their outbreaks, there was a mean of 123 ± 28 Ebola journal publications 
and 2 ± 1 Zika journal publications from 2009-2013 [Figure 3]. However, during the 
outbreak period, this number doubled each year of the Ebola outbreak from 233 
publications in 2014 to 493 publications in 2015. Similarly, the number of Zika 
publications increased ten-fold to 13 in 2014 and 19 in 2015. The number of Zika 
publications in 2016 is already set to break this annual record given its eight 
biotechnology publications during the first quarter. No patent applications that solely 
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targeted Zika virus were identified using the “Title” search criteria; however, an average 
of 9 ± 5 patents that included Zika in its “Claim(s)” and/or “Description/Specification” 
were identified from 2009-2014. No patent applications were submitted in 2015 or 2016; 
thus, no period comparison could be conducted. As previously stated, there is only one 
FDA-approved biotechnology product for either Zika or Ebola: ReEBOV Antigen Rapid 
Test Kit (Corgenix, USA) for Ebola diagnosis. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Biotechnology Publications of Zika and Ebola (2009-2016) 
 
Limitations 
 There exist several limitations regarding the interpretation of network analysis 
statistics and the generalizability of results. This is largely due to the fact that such 
statistics are highly dependent on the availability and quality of inputted source 
information. In this study, published literature was used as the basis for network 
mapping; as such, it is possible that some current research teams and collaborations were 
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excluded. Nevertheless, as this study ultimately seeks to identify productive R&D 
collaborations that advance future commercial development of biotechnologies, it is 
unlikely that a research group that contributed meaningful scientific and technological 
knowledge from 2009-2016 was missing from the database. Finally, a network analysis 
does not explore or explain potentially interfering external factors, such as national R&D 
policies, variances in protection of intellectual property rights, and different cultural 
paradigms regarding openness. Thus, network analyses should be interpreted with caution 
due to limitations in the existing knowledge base regarding inherent heterogeneity among 
nodes and their ability to form links. Nevertheless, meaningful interpretations about the 
global state of biotechnology R&D for Zika and Ebola viruses were made by analyzing 
the entire R&D network—not just individual nodes— attempting to overcome this 
nuanced framework. Finally, it is known that bibliometric and patent data offer an 
incomplete measure of innovation since a publication does not guarantee a patent or 
commercial product and there is no method to differentiate between incremental and 
disruptive innovation. Still, as multiple standard indicators were used as a proxy for 
scientific, technological, and commercial productivity and innovation, it is improbable 
that this altered the resultant trend, but it might have overestimated the magnitude. Given 
the low productivity of the current Ebola and Zika networks, this only serves to further 
support the study’s findings of deficient biotechnology R&D practices. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Zika epidemic draws several parallels to the Ebola pandemic, particularly 
with regard to the gradual global response and comparable absence of commercial 
diagnostics, therapies, and vaccines [Figure 4]. Prior to the two large outbreaks, there 
were no obvious scientific barriers to the development of either an Ebola or Zika vaccine, 
rapid diagnostic test, or treatment5,6. Yet, no measures were taken to rectify this 
technology dearth until five months after the Ebola outbreak began in West Africa and 
nine months after Brazil first detected Zika virus [Figure 4].  
 
 
Figure 4. Timeline of Ebola and Zika Biotechnology R&D Milestones  
 
This reactive, sluggish global response to both outbreaks demonstrates that 
external factors, such as political will and public outcry, currently decide if, when, and 
how current R&D networks develop biotechnologies for an emerging disease. Given the 
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proliferation of clinical trials that emerged over the course of each epidemic, it is clear 
that the R&D networks for Zika, Ebola, and other emerging pathogens currently wait for 
a public health emergency to initiate or accelerate commercial biotechnologies for 
neglected diseases. That is, current R&D practices are primarily reactionary in response 
to an outbreak rather than precautionary or proactive. While this isn’t inherently poor 
practice, as there exists no endogenous market incentives for neglected diseases and 
biomedical R&D is an expensive process, this dichotomy becomes significant given that 
we were unable to predict either the Zika or Ebola epidemic27. 
 
Studies have shown that better, more complex solutions are developed via 
collaboration and teamwork than by individuals alone28. However, there simply aren’t 
enough researchers tackling emerging diseases globally prior to a large-scale outbreak 
[Figures 1 and 2] and, of those that do exist pre-outbreak, virtually all operate under an 
isolated R&D approach rather than one that promotes open collaboration. In fact, not 
only do the pre-outbreak biotechnology R&D networks of Ebola and Zika contain a low 
overall number of nodes, the majority of which are small in size, but the networks are 
also highly fragmented with only a few nodes dominating the entire R&D space while the 
remaining nodes have very minimal connectivity. As such, the pre-outbreak Zika and 
Ebola R&D networks underperformed with respect to scientific and technological 
productivity. Particularly, each network only relied on a few number of institutes to 
coordinate and conduct the majority of precautionary biomedical research. It follows that 
the number of publications, patents, and commercial products would also be modicum 
[Figures 3 and 4]. 
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However, it should be noted that both the Zika and Ebola networks systemically 
changed formation during their outbreaks as seen by the transition to more dense, 
centralized networks [Figures 1 and 2]. As each network gained not just more nodes, but 
more interconnected nodes, R&D productivity increased correspondingly [Figure 3]. 
Consequently, it appears that the current trend of Zika and Ebola R&D practices—even 
prior to the WHO’s new recommendation—is to instinctively shift towards greater 
connectivity and co-creation during highly publicized public health emergencies and 
epidemics. As such, WHO’s current open access and data sharing provision merely 
supports naturally-occurring open R&D practices rather than stimulates more proactive, 
improved data dissemination practices. Yet, it is because of these current pre-outbreak 
R&D deficiencies that diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines were not developed for 
Zika and Ebola. This is critical since, in the case of Ebola, the post-outbreak R&D 
network map indicates a natural reversion to a less connected state with a reduced 
number of nodes [Figure 1] and is associated with a decrease in R&D productivity 
[Figure 3]. Since the current reactionary open R&D practices do not translate to long-
term R&D productivity (and subsequent commercial development), WHO should have 
bolstered a strategy that not only addresses pre-outbreak R&D deficiencies but also 
extends the permanence of open, collaborative R&D practices beyond the acute crisis. 
 
 As such, the ability of WHO’s September 2015 recommendation to reduce the 
impact of future epidemics is limited by its inherently reactionary and short-term R&D 
response to an epidemic. This is imprudent since open access, data sharing, and co-
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creation prior to an outbreak has the potential to more quickly reduce the burden of 
disease since proactive sharing can increase the quantity and quality of data accumulated, 
while also pooling risk22. Moreover, the endorsed strategy only mimics the endogenous 
behavior already exhibited by current R&D networks during public health crises and it 
does not address the lack of vital long-term support for maintaining these collaborative, 
open data access and data sharing practices. Instead, WHO implicitly allows these hyper-
productive, highly connected R&D networks during public health crises to regress to 
non-collaborative R&D practices post-outbreak. The position does not support the 
essential continuation of preliminary scientific and technological progress made via open 
R&D during an outbreak once political will, public outcry, and funding mechanisms 
decline. This is paramount to avoid complacency between outbreaks on unfinished 
biotechnology R&D. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Current R&D efforts for emerging diseases remain primarily reactionary in 
response to debilitating disease outbreaks rather than proactive. As the Zika outbreak is 
still ongoing, a similar natural trend of reversibility in collaborative R&D practices 
following the conclusion of its epidemic cannot yet be determined, but we must 
preemptively ensure it does not occur. Collaboration begets innovation, and, when the 
majority of existing R&D networks only seek a high level of collaboration during times 
of public health crises and revert to traditional strategies once an outbreak is contained, 
the effectiveness and benefit of an open R&D strategy, even one endorsed by WHO, is 
squelched by its ephemeral applicability and limited use. As such, although the WHO’s 
recommendation is laudable, it fails to recognize that open R&D practices presently 
occur endogenously during emerging disease pandemics. The endorsement does not 
improve current emerging disease networks’ long-term ability to advance scientific 
knowledge and develop commercial biotechnologies. If not revised, the same deficient, 
reactionary R&D practices that failed to develop commercial diagnostics, therapeutics, 
and vaccines prior to the Zika and Ebola outbreaks will remain and it is uncertain if other 
emerging disease R&D networks will be able to overcome these systemic R&D 
deficiencies prior to an outbreak. 
 
The acceleration of existing scientific and technological knowledge should not be 
dependent on a catastrophic event, especially when WHO’s established best practice to 
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quickly advance the development of therapeutics, diagnostics, and vaccines during crises 
is through the exploitation of open collaboration and access. As such, WHO should 
update its recommendation to endorse and support permanent data sharing and open 
access for all emerging diseases regardless of its status as a “public health emergency of 
international concern”. If actively utilized before a pathogen can cause an outbreak, 
formally organizing and managing long-term open R&D networks has the potential to 
vastly improve global vaccine, diagnostic, and treatment development efforts for 
emerging diseases. If WHO wishes to prevent a similar paucity of available 
biotechnologies at the onset of the next emerging disease epidemic, enhanced research 
collaboration prior to outbreaks is requisite and regulated strategic innovation practices 
must be employed globally. Although there is no single guaranteed strategy for success, 
shifting the research paradigm is crucial to overcoming the existing systemic R&D 
barriers for emerging diseases. As the international research community cannot 
definitively predict the next epidemic, adjusting current R&D practices to encompass 
long-term open, collaborative R&D strategies offers the potential to more effectively 
mitigate both the global health and economic burdens associated with emerging diseases 
of epidemic potential. 
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